Journal of Economics and Financial Analysis, 8 (2), pp. 23-45, [2024]
URI: https://ojs.tripaledu.com/jefa/article/view/94/104

Fiscal Councils and Creative Accounting in EU Member States


University of Erfurt, Germany



Abstract

We study the relationship between fiscal councils and creative accounting in 27 European Union (EU) countries. We use stock-flow adjustments to indicate creative accounting and relate them to our fiscal council indicator in a panel framework. Regarding the fiscal rules that trigger creative accounting, we distinguish between external (resulting from European Monetary Union membership) and internal fiscal rules. While fiscal councils are not significant when used as stand-alone variable their interaction with fiscal rules is significant. Our findings indicate that fiscal councils reduce creative accounting triggered by fiscal rules and thus help to enforce fiscal rules and sound fiscal policies.

Keywords

Fiscal Councils; Creative Accounting; European Monetary Union; Fiscal Rules; Stock-Flow Adjustments.

JEL Classification

H60, H62, H63, H83.

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